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of Oakland City,1s the court ignored this distinction, and apparently thought
that underlying the lease was the same purpose to evade the law in one as
in the other. The instant decision does not mention the Bryant case.
Ignoring the cases altogether, it seems, on principle, if we look at the
substance of the transaction1 9 and remember that the constitutional limitation
is effective against both expressed and implied liability,2 0 that the present
decision is incorrect. If and when the rental payments retired the investments
of the lessor, the school township became owner of the property without even
exercising its option to purchase. The lessor received no profits-it was no
more than a dummy through whose hands the cost of construction of the
building was to pass from the township to the security holders. Thus, it
would seem that this case is an evasion of the constitutional limitation and is
inconsistent with both principle and established precedent. M. J. W.
PAYMENTS-SURETY's RIGHT TO DIRECT APPLIcATIN.-Defendant was surety
for the Karstedt Construction Company on a contract requiring repairs on a
school building. Plaintiff, a subcontractor, performed certain work for the
Construction Company, and applied payments made out of proceeds of the
secured contract on prior claims arising out of other contracts. Plaintiff
brought the present action to recover from the surety the amount of the
indebtedness arising out of the assured contract. Defendant contends that
the payments from funds arising out of the present contract should be applied
on debts arising out of the same contract. Held, in the absence of direction
by the debtor, the creditor may apply the payments received to any claim due
him from the debtor regardless of his knowledge of the source of the funds.1
In regard to the' right of the surety to have the proceeds of the contract
which he assures applied to the claims arising out of the contract, there are
three distinct rules adopted by the courts: First, regardless of the knowledge
of the source of the payments received, the creditor must apply them to the
secured claims;2 Second, if the creditor knows the source of the payments,
he must apply them to the secured claims;8 Third, regardless of knowledge,
the creditor may apply the payments as he sees fit.4 Before discussing the
various rules, it is well to note some of the general rules as to the application
of payments. In the first place, the debtor has the right to say how the pay-
ments which he makes shall be applied.5 In the absence of direction by the
18 Bryant v. School Town of Oakland City (1930), 202 Ind. 254, 171 N. E.
378.
19 State ex. rel. Matthews v. Forsythe (1896), 147 Ind. 466, 473, 44 N. E.
593.
20 Eddy Valve Co. v. Town Crown Point (1906), 166 Ind. 613.
1 Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Cramer (1937), 10 N. E. (2d) 440,
(Ind. App. Court).
2 Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks (1915), 227 F. 780; Crane Co. v. Pacific
Heat Co. (1904), 36 Wash. 95, 78 P. 460.
3Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dupree (1931), 223 Ala. 420, 136 S. 811;
Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1916), 92 Wash. 52, 158 P. 740;
Salt Lake City v. O'Connor (1926), 68 Utah 233, 249 P. 810.
4 Grover v. Board of Education (1928), 102 N. 3. Eq. 415, 141 A. 81;
City of Marshfield v. United States Fidelity Co. (1929), 128 Ore. 547, 274 P.
503; Standard Oil v. Day (1924), 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410.
5Trentman v. Fletcher (1885), 100 Ind. 105.
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debtor as to how the application should be made the creditor may apply the
payments as he sees fit.6 If neither the debtor nor the creditor has made any
application and litigation arises, the courts will direct the application. 7 The
problem in the present case arises when the funds with which the payments
are made come from a source which, also, gave rise to a part, but not all of
the claims.
The first rule which gives the surety the right to direct the application
seems to base the decision on the idea that an equity in favor of the surety
arises out of the fact relating to the source of the payments; that the debtor
receives full credit for the payments regardless of the account on which it is
applied; and that the creditor is not harmed, for in case of payment on either
account he still has the claim for the other. However, this rationale really
ignores the facts; for the surety is seldom called on to pay when the principal
is not in financial difficulties. Furthermore, a reapplication might be a
definite hardship, since the creditor may have released the security which he
had for the other debt. For the surety, however, it may be said that he
assures only payment of the claims arising out of the contract, or that the
contract will not be a losing one, and that he does not assure the financial
solvency of the contractor. To state the argument another way, the courts
feel that each building contract should be self-supporting. Out of this arises
the equity to which, under this view of the law, the courts give full protection.8
The courts would not protect this equity, of course, if a superior equity in
favor of the creditor should arise, as from the release of a lien.
According to the second view of the law under the present circumstances,
the creditor's knowledge of the source of the funds from which he is paid
will cause his rights to be subordinated to those of the surety.9 The arguments
in favor of the first rule apply with more force here; for before the creditor
has made any application or released any securities, he knows of the source
of the money. Under such circumstances it is less of a hardship to require a
reapplication than in the case where the first application was made in ignor-
ance of the source of the funds. Unless the first application was made in
ignorance the courts adopting this view of the law do not consider it a
hardship to require a reapplication. Here, of course, the burden is on the
surety to show that payments applied to prior indebtedness were made with
funds which the surety was entitled to have applied in discharge of his obliga-
tion;1O the creditor has no duty to determine the source of the payments.'1
There are a number of courts which state the rule as announced in the
principal case to the effect that knowledge of the source of payments is
immaterial, and that the creditor can apply them as he desires if the debtor
6 Crane Co. v. United States Fidelity Co. (1913), 74 Wash. 91, 132 P. 872.
7 Bell v. Bell (1911), 174 Ala. 446, 56 S. 926; Cain v. Vogt (1908), 138
Iowa 631, 116 N. W. 786.
8 Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks (1915), 227 F. 780; Sioux City Foundry
Co. v. Merten (1916), 174 Iowa 332, 156 N. W. 367; Thompson v. Commercial
Union Co. (1904-), 20 Colo. App. 331, 78 P. 1073.
9 Salt Lake City v. O'Connor (1926), 68 Utah 233, 249 P. 810; Chicago
Lumber Co. v. Douglas (1913), 89 Kan. 308, 131 P. 563; Wanamaker v.
Powers (1905), 102 App. Div. 485, 93 N. Y. S. 19.
10 Merchants Ins. Co. v. Herbert (1897), 68 Minn. 420, 71 N. W. 624;
Fulton Grain Co. v. Anghim (1899), 44 App. Div. 488, 69 N. Y. S. 957.
11 Salt Lake City v. O'Connor (1926), 68 Utah 233, 249 P. 810.
INDIAlN-4 LAW JOURNA1L
gives no direction.1 2 The courts following this view recognize the hardship
of requiring a reapplication and a revival of a debt which was once considered
discharged. Futhermore, this view is consistent with the idea that the money
is the property of the contractor and he could have used it in payment of
other creditors unconnected with the assured contract.1 3 Thus, this view of
the law is consistent with idea of the negotiability of money and is com-
mercially desirable, inasmuch as the other views tend to place restrictions on
the use of the money used in making the payments.
The third view, which gives the surety no right to regulate the application
of the payments, seems to be the view which is gaining the most support.
It is not unfair to the surety, because he could refuse to assure a contractor
who was already heavily in dbt. Furthermore, the surety could provide in
the agreement just how the funds should be applied and could secure ample
protection in this way, since if such agreement were known to the creditor
he would have to respect it.14 Rt. E. M.
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ANTI-INJUNCTION ACr-EXISTENCE OF A LABOR DIspUTr.-
Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, maintained several meat markets in Mil-
waukee, Wis., employing a total of some thirty persons, none of whom were
union members. Defendants, members of a labor union, after a fruitless
demand that plaintiff require its employees to become members of the union,
picketed plaintiff's place of business to force unionization. On a bill in the
Federal courts for an injunction, Held, a labor dispute existed within the
meaning of both the Federall and the state2 anti-injunction acts, and an injunc-
tion could not issue except in accordance with those acts.S
In surprisingly few words, 4 the Supreme Court has cast aside doubts as
to the constitutionality of the Norris-Laguardia Act-doubts that have persisted
during the six years that have elapsed since its adoption.5 In equally brief
fashion, the Court has laid down its first authoritative construction of the Act.
12 Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Cramer (1937), 10 N. E. (2d) 440;
(Ind. App. Court); Hirth v. Powers (1896), 108 Mich. 339, 66 N. W. 215;
Grace Harbor Lumber Co. v. Ortman (1916), 190 Mich. 429, 157 N. W. 96;
Radichel v. Federal Security Co. (1927), 170 Minn. 92, 212 N. W. 171;
Standard Oil v. Day (1924), 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410; City of Marshfield
v. United States Fidelity Co. (1929), 128 Ore. 547, 274 P. 503.
13Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Union State Bank (1927), 21 F. (2d) 102.
14 White v. Beem (1881), 80 Ind. 239.
147 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§101-115.
2 State statutes similar to the Federal Act have been adopted in Indiana
(Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, §§ 40-50iff), Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin. SEveral other states have restrictive statutes of
narrower scope.
3 Lauf et al v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), - S. Ct. -.
4 The majority opinion found it necessary to cite only one authority for its
result, simply stating, "There can be no question of the power of Congress
thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United
States."
5 Recent indications had pointed to this result. The Supreme Court had
upheld the Wisconsin statute in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union (1937),
301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. '857. The lower Federal courts had consistently upheld
the Act, as had the majority of state courts in passing upon the validity of
their statutes. See, for example, Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin (CCA,
